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FOREWORD: NONJUDICIAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WILLIAM

D. POPKIN*

In the past decade the study of statutory interpretation has gone
from benign neglect to intense scrutiny, but the emphasis has remained
on interpretation by courts. This symposium takes a different approach.
The major theme is that interpretation depends on the interpreter and
that we can gain insight into statutory interpretation, even by courts,
from analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of nonjudicial interpreters.
Part I of this Foreword places the symposium in the broader setting of
recent literature on statutory interpretation, briefly reviewing the major
schools of thought and explaining the contributors' perspectives. Part II
sets forth my own views about judicial reliance on a particularly controversial type of nonjudicial interpretation-statements about specific legislative intent found in legislative history. It supports the dominant theme
of the symposium, which is that the interpreter's institutional competence should determine the weight accorded to the interpreter's
conclusions.
I.

THEMES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A.

Recent Literature

The recent literature on statutory interpretation has encouraged new
ways of looking at the two major criteria that courts use to determine
statutory meaning-legislative intent and the text itself.
Legislative intent no longer looks the same as it did under the benign Legal Process formulation, which assumed that legislation was the
product of reasonable people implementing reasonable purposes, to be
reconstructed by courts in the context of the specific case. Under the
influence of the Law and Economics movement, we cannot suppress the
suspicion that legislation is the undemocratically controlled product of
otherwise indeterminate legislative decisionmaking, strongly influenced
by private interest logrolling and compromise. 1 Despite renewed efforts
2
to describe legislation from a civic virtue or public value perspective, it
*

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).

1. See generally Mashaw, The Economics of Politicsand the Understandingof Public Law, 65
CHi-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEx. L.

REV. 873 (1987).
2. The latest are Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
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will be hard to restore the level of optimism about politics that once prevailed. Legislative history, traditionally relied on by courts as a major
source of information about legislative intent, has also lost its innocence.
Its use to interpret statutes has been both attacked3 and cautiously
4
rehabilitated.
The idea of the text has also been transformed, both in terms of the
conception of the relevant text and the interaction between the text and
judicial reader. The conception of the relevant text in Justice Scalia's
"New Textualism" bears little resemblance to the few words on whose
plain meaning the judge can rely without much effort. 5 His text is a set
of complex statutory provisions, yielding their meaning to a sophisticated
6
but nonetheless deferential grammatical analysis.
A radically different view of the interaction of text and judicial
reader is implied by those influenced by the Law and Literature movement. 7 In this view, the judicial reader plays an inevitably creative role
in defining and shaping the interpreted text, although there are significant differences of opinion about what perspective the reader does or
should adopt. Many of these differences are aired in Robin West's contribution to this symposium, especially in her discussion of benign and
malign interpretive communities. 8 Other differences concern the extent
to which historical or contemporary meaning should be openly avowed
as the interpreter's objective. 9
After this explosion of interest in statutory interpretation, there are
signs that we have come full circle to a modified revival of the traditional
Legal Process approach. The New Pragmatism, eschewing "foundational" approaches to interpretation and eclectically drawing on every
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COL. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990).
3. See Report to the Attorney General, Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1989).
4. See Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 CH-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990).
5. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
6. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation

(forthcoming).
7. See generally, Symposium, Law and Literature,60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982); Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneuticaland PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985); Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988); West, Communities, Texts,
and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement, I YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988);
Eskridge, Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990).
8. See West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 451
(1990).
9. See generally Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988);
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). Even Justice Scalia
admits to being a "faint-hearted" originalist, at least with respect to the constitutional text. See
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
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available insight into statutory meaning, advocates what looks a lot like
judicial reconstruction of legislative intent.10
B.

Symposium Themes

The emphasis on the judicial reader, so prevalent in the current
literature, will continue to dominate writing on statutory interpretation,
but there are two reasons why other interpreters are important. First,
they often "make" law because their determinations are, as a practical
matter, final. Second, judges often decide to rely on other interpreters.
Thus, the meanings determined by nonjudicial interpreters have legal as
well as practical significance. Every article in this symposium addresses
questions of nonjudicial interpretation.
1. Agency Interpretation
Peter Strauss deals with administrative agency interpretation and,
more specifically, with the agency's use of legislative history. He argues
that the agency's reliance on both the historical origins and evolving
political history of a statute supports the rule of law by countering the
impact of current legislative politics on agency decisions. It also helps
agencies operate in the middle ground between law and politics, allowing
them to play the dynamic interpretive role some have advocated more
generally for courts. Finally, agencies are able to identify and avoid the
chaff of politically manipulative and staff-created legislative history.
Agency use of legislative history is therefore more defensible than judicial use and, from a judicial perspective, provides one more argument in
favor of Chevron's I mandate that courts defer to agency decisions.
Michael Fitts welcomes this "administrative law" perspective on
agency interpretation in his comment on Strauss's article, but he questions whether it will make the positive contribution to the rule of law
that Strauss anticipates. Fitts is especially concerned with the power that
agency reliance on legislative history gives to the bureaucracy and legislative committees over the political decisions of the President and Congress. He also observes a tension between the agency's commitment to
legislative history fashioned by the legislature adopting a statute and its
reliance on evolving agency interactions with the legislature.
10. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1569-1853 (1990).
11. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Legislative History

William Eskridge is also concerned with nonjudicial interpretation
but primarily from a judicial point of view. His concern is with the values that courts should adopt in deciding whether to rely on legislative
history. He focusses on the use of legislative history in three contexts: to
identify specific legislative intent, general legislative intent, and meta-intent (or truth value). He subjects each use to a constitutional, a political
theory, and a jurisprudential critique.
Eskridge is unsympathetic with the constitutional critique and several versions of the jurisprudential critique, all of which privilege the
statutory text. He makes several objections: the text, as broadly defined
to include the entire body of statute law, often lacks objectively ascertainable meaning; judicial refusal to follow absurd meanings undermines formalist claims for the text's authority; and legitimate concerns about
judicial discretion in determining intent are reduced if we posit judges as
"relational agents" serving a legislative principal, rather than as willful
imposers of their own political values.
Eskridge is more troubled by the political critique. He draws primarily on the public choice and Law and Economics literature to observe
that politics is often dominated by selected private interests and that the
makers of legislative history may be especially influenced by such interests. Ultimately, his response is to use legislative history cautiously in
the practical reasoning process by which judges reconstruct legislative
intent. To Eskridge, legislative history is part of the body of evidence
which enables judges to learn about the truth value of legislation.
Frank Easterbrook, in his comment, cannot accept Eskridge's enthusiasm for judicial use of legislative history to reconstruct legislative
intent. Nonetheless, he would allow legislative history the narrow role of
identifying the limits of the statute's domain.
3.

Congressional Interpretation

Robin West deals with yet another nonjudicial interpreter--Congress-but from a decidedly nonjudicial point of view. Borrowing the
concept of "audience" from literary criticism, she argues that a text's
meaning depends on its audience. She claims that we have too readily
assumed that the audience for a legal text is the judge. In fact, Congress
is another important audience for the constitutional text, with a potentially different perspective on its meaning.
After reviewing the literature about the reader's creative interpretive
role, West concludes that judicial interpretation is not fully explained
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either by the indeterminacy of the author's intent and the legal text or by
the influence of benign or malign community perspectives. She argues
that the court's definition of the text as "legal" brings with it a jurisprudential perspective that forces decisions into the "justice" mold, producing results framed in terms of individual rights, wrongs, and remedies.
On the other hand, Congress, as a political body, is not constrained
by this "legal" perspective. Congress has the aspirational potential
(though not necessarily the inclination) to prefer the "good" to the
"just." The elected legislature is a very different audience from the
courts, and views its interpretive role differently. As an illustration, she
explains how the text of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution would look different to a Congress concerned with the
"good," rather than to a law-oriented court concerned with individual
rights, wrongs, and remedies. She is clearly less sanguine about courts
avoiding "legalism" than are advocates of dynamic or civic virtue interpretation. West urges us to shift attention away from judges to other
audiences, such as legislatures, which do not adopt a jurisprudential
point of view.
Larry Marshall, commenting on West's piece, is enthusiastic about
her emphasis on a distinctive congressional approach to determining constitutional meaning, but is worried about how Congress can be encouraged to address problems' of constitutional meaning. He urges
courts to provide Congress with an incentive by restricting the presumption that the statute is constitutional to cases in which Congress deliberated about the constitutional issue.
Although West's discussion deals with congressional interpretation
of the constitutional text, the concept of "audience" is also important for
understanding judicial interpretation of statutes. Difficult problems of
interpretation often boil down to the judge choosing which audience's
reading should be preferred on the basis of values which the judge deems
important. For example, courts can implement democratic values by
choosing the audience intended by the legislature. The court also can
protect reliance interests by adopting the meaning that the reading public
is likely to infer. 12 In the classic case of defining tomatoes as "vegetables"' 13 (and other "easy" cases), both approaches converge to the same
result. The legislature intended a nontechnical audience to rely on the
statute and the nontechnically trained audience was the public most
12.
ing over
political
13.

In addition to protecting reliance interests, judicial preference for the public reader's meanlegislative intent prevents hidden legislative meanings from undermining straightforward
language.
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
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likely to read and rely on the text. This consideration supported a colloquial definition of tomatoes as vegetables rather than a technically (botanically) correct definition of tomatoes as fruits.
When the intended audience and the public audience likely to rely
on the text adopt different readings, however, the court must choose the
relevant audience. For example, the choice between historical and contemporary understanding may require choosing between the intended
historical audience, thereby implementing legislative intent, or the meaning that the contemporary reader is likely to adopt. 1 4 In two recent
cases, the Supreme Court adopted the historical over contemporary usage in defining "race,"'' 5 but simply assumed without explanation that
the perspective of the historical audience was privileged.
Even focussing on the contemporary public reading may still require
a judicial choice of the statute's audience if the text is capable of both a
relatively obvious colloquial meaning and a meaning apparent only on
the basis of a more complex textual analysis. Although the general public rarely relies directly on a statutory text, professionals may disagree
about how to read statutory language. The specialized practitioner, for
example, may bring a degree of textual sophistication that other lawyers
do not share. And some legislative subjects may be expected to invite
complex textual analysis, rather than a simpler, more visceral understanding of the text's meaning. The courts usually fail to notice this
potential conflict, adopting either a colloquial or more technically sophisticated reading without explaining why the perspective of one or the
other audience should be preferred. 16
Implicit in the discussion of nonjudicial interpreters is the idea that
14. If the historical legislature intended an open-ended meaning, evolving over time, then there
is no conflict between legislative intent and a contemporary reading. Inferences about open-ended
intent are notoriously difficult to make in many cases.
15. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Share Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S.Ct. 2019 (1987) ("racial discrimination" includes discrimination against ethnic Arabs and Jews, because that was the meaning of "race" at the time of the statute's adoption).
16. The problem of determining whether the audience is the one with a colloquial or more
sophisticated understanding of the text also underlies many cases of ambiguous meaning. For example, in Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S.Ct. 2499 (1990), the statute helped welfare families by disregarding
$50 of "child support" in computing welfare benefits. The question was whether Social Security
payments for a child were "child support." There were two choices. A colloquial definition of
"child support" included any payments for a child, including Social Security. A more technical
definition, however, limited "child support" to parental support. The Court adopted the technical
definition, noting that the disregard provision appeared in the same part of the statute that dealt with
tracking down parents to obtain child support. Nowhere in the majority opinion was there an explanation for why the technical reader was to be preferred over the more colloquially inclined audience.
The scant nontexutal evidence revealed a "general" intent favoring the colloquial reading, because
the statute was adopted to relieve welfare families of the burden of including a child's income in total
family income. Id. at 2510 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Stroop was typical in not discussing the problem of choice between a colloquial and a more
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each might have a competence that justifies deference to his or her view
of the text's meaning. One consequence of the search for the most competent interpreter is that we must become empiricists about how nonjudicial interpreters function in order to decide whether to rely on what they
say. In the remainder of this Foreword, I will apply that approach by
reporting what we know from the political science literature about how
legislative history is created. I will use that information to make judgments about whether courts should rely on a particular type of legislative
history.
My interest is in the much maligned institution of staff-created and
manufactured legislative history. This type of legislative history sets
forth statements of specific legislative intent about what the legislature
was trying to achieve-what I call specific legislative history. Specific
legislative history is, in effect, a rival to the statutory text in dealing with
the particular issue being litigated. It contrasts with more general statements about statutory context and purpose-general legislative history.
General legislative history is certainly not without its problems, which it
shares with all evidence of statutory purpose. It is often imprecise and
conflicting, permitting courts to read into the text a wide variety of specific meanings. But general legislative history is usually not as objectionable as specific legislative history, because it is less likely to be used
explicitly to manipulate political results and is not a rival text disposing
of the litigated issue. 17 Despite serious concerns about specific legislative history, I conclude that considerations of institutional competence
sometimes justify its use by courts to determine statutory meaning.
II.

CHOOSING THE MOST COMPETENT INTERPRETER-THE
PROBLEM OF SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A.

Models of Politics

There is hardly a more controversial nonjudicial interpreter of statutes than the authors of specific statements about legislative intent apsophisticated reading. In Mohasco v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980), Justice Stevens recognized
the problem but avoided choosing because, in his view, both readings produced the same result.
17. The British approach is based on a distinction between general and specific legislative history. British judges will use legislative history to understand legislative context, or general purpose,
but will not rely on statements about specific legislative intent. See Black-Clawson Ltd. v.
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A G [1975] 1 All. E.R. 810, 822, 828; The Law Commission
and the Scottish Law Commission 13, 32-34 (1969).
The British also claim not to use Parliamentary materials (such as committee reports or debates) for any purpose, but this judicial rule is sometimes breached. When a British judge recently
admitted to peeking at forbidden legislative history (Hadmor Productions v. Hamilton [1981] 2 All
E.R. 724, 731 (C.A.) (Lord Denning)), he was reprimanded on appeal to the House of Lords by
Lord Diplock. Hadmor Productions v. Hamilton [1982] 1 All E.R. 1042, 1050-51.
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pearing in legislative history. The problem with these interpreters can be
summed up this way. There is a gap between those who create legislative
history and the requirements imposed by three normative models of
8
political decisionmaking. 1
First, the public choice model, is concerned with the impact of private interests on legislative decisions. It faults a political process in
which some private interests have the power to override under-represented points of view. Second, the deliberative model requires elected
legislators to engage in open-minded and respectful deliberation about
political means and ends, fitting statutory detail into a statutory structure. Third, the public value model expects politics to implement public
values, and will not settle for either the balanced representation of private interests or meaningful deliberation about statutory structure.
The realities of the legislative process suggest that the creation of
specific legislative history may not be able to satisfy the requirements of
one or more of these models. As explained in Part IIB, the dominant
role of staff and a narrow group of legislators in writing legislative history may undermine deliberative values, skew the content of legislative
history towards powerful private interests, and deprive the entire body of
legislators of the opportunity to participate in writing statutes.
The fact that the statutory text may be unclear does little to ease
concerns about the authors of legislative history. An unclear text simply
eliminates the powerful argument that a clear statutory text should not
be undermined by hidden meanings found in legislative history.' 9 The
problems posed by the authors persist, however, when deciding whether
to rely on specific legislative history, even when the text is unclear.
Part IIB will review the literature about the creation of specific legislative history, laying the groundwork for evaluating its competence as
evidence of statutory meaning. Part IIC sets forth a standard for evaluating judicial reliance on such legislative history. Finally, Part IID applies that standard to committee reports and the congressional record.
18. Discussions of these models of politics appear in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988); Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
19. Generally, a clear text will defeat legislative history. The leading case is Commissioner v.
Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1959). A recent case is Eagle-Picher Industries v. United States EPA,
759 F.2d 922, 928-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The debate in the Supreme Court erupted in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 n.12 (1987) (a clearly expressed intent in the legislative history
might question the strong presumption that intent is expressed through the statutory language); but
see id. at 1224 (Scalia, J., concurring) (even strong legislative history should not be used to qualify
the plain meaning of the language, except to check up on whether a result is indeed absurd).

19901'

FOREWORD

B.

Information about how Legislative History is Made
1. Staff

Legislative staff play a prominent role in drafting legislative history.20 That much is clear. But why is this a defect in the political process,- precluding reliance on legislative history? The most serious
complaint about the role of staff concerns the bureaucratization of Congress and the negative implications this has for a deliberative model of
politics. In the deliberative model, elected legislators link the details of
the law to the broader framework of the statute.2 1 According to this
view, law is not the development of broad principles, leaving others to
work out the details, but a process of understanding principles by relating details to the statutory structure. Therefore, when the staff performs
detail work, legislators do not engage in meaningful deliberation.
Staff achieve their independence because legislators require large
staffs to confront both lobbyists and the Executive Branch on equal
terms. As a result, these realities have converted legislators into managers of large bureaucratic offices in which a significant amount of power
must be delegated. I am not suggesting, as some do, 22 that staff run
amok or act in disregard of their employer's wishes.2 3 The picture that
emerges from studies of staff belies the image of excessive independence.
20. The leading work is K. KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS 17-34, 121-33 (3d

ed. 1977). See also Report to the Attorney General, supra note 3, at 15, 55 n.223 & 56; E. REDMAN,
THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973); Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 43, 44-45 (1988).
Judicial comments on the role of staff include: Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051,
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva, J., concurring); Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005,
1030-32 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting), Justice Powell objected to reliance on Congress to protect
states from federal encroachment because of the growing role of staff in legislation.
Whether or not to rely on legislative history written by staff is clearly tested by judicial reliance
on the so-called Blue Book written by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to explain federal
tax law. The Blue Book is issued after passage of a tax law and is not itself a report of a legislative
committee. Courts usually consider this document relevant, but not dispositive. See generally
United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 n. 15 (1983); Social Service of Minn. v. United States, 583
F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (D. Minn. 1984); Zinniel v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 357, 366-67 (1987).
21. M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 247 (1980).
22. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("heady staffer"); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 437-38 (1988) (discussing charge that staff run amok).
23. M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 12, 28; Price, Professionalsand "Entrepreneurs".Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. POL. 316, 329-30 (1971). See generally
Hammond, Legislative Staffs in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 285 (G. Loewenberg, S.
Patterson, & M. Jewell, eds. 1985).
The apparent plausibility of that charge rests on studies emphasizing the growing entrepreneurial role of staff in developing legislative policy options and proposals, in contrast to the
more traditional professional role of reacting to whatever task comes along.
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Staff/employer relationships are characterized by loyalty, trust, influence, and congruence of views. 24 Nonetheless, the leash restraining legislative staff may still be too long from the perspective of the deliberative
model. Through the drafting of legislative history, staff undoubtedly retain considerable discretion to work out legislative details consistent with
their employer's wishes. 25 The potential danger this presents to a delib26
erative model of the political process cannot be disregarded.
The danger can, however, be overstated. A deliberative ideal that
forces legislators to work out the relationship of all matters of statutory
detail to the general statutory structure is too demanding. 27 Agencies
and courts have long been expected to work out statutory detail, precisely because legislatures cannot always do so. The staff's prominent
role in negotiating statutory texts28 may make them sensitive to the overall statutory structure, sometimes more so than legislators. Their careful
attention to detail may give them an interpretive competence that justifies judicial reliance on the legislative history.
An example from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 illustrates this point.
The definition of a student's earned income became important after 1986
for two reasons-certain deductions could reduce earned income (such
as salary), but not unearned income (such as dividends and interest), and
the living expense portion of student scholarships became taxable. The
statute, however, failed to specify whether taxable scholarships fall
within the more favorable category of "earned" income. The Conference
Committee Report filled this gap by defining earned income to include
24. M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 82-83, 239; Hammond, supra note 23, at 284-85; Manley,

Congressional Staff & Public Policy Making: The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 30
J. POL. 1046, 1067 (1968); Fallows, Technical Staffing For Congress: The Myth of Expertise 123-33
(1980); Patterson, Congressional Committee Professional Staffing. Capabilities & Constraints in LEGISLATURES IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 413 (A. Kornberg & L. Mulolf, eds.) (1970); R.

243, 247 (2d ed. 1978); A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE
GOOD 112 (1983).
25. See M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 247. See also Manley, supra note 24, at 1066 (the more
complex the task, the more staff power).
RIPLEY, CONGRESS-PROCESS AND POLICY
COMMON

26. See M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 5-7, 240-51; W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 172 (6th ed. 1985).

27. We should also be careful about translating reports in the political science literature concerning independent staff behavior into a specific judgment about how legislative history is made.
See STENGER, CONGRESSIONAL COMMI-rrEE STAFF MEMBERS: POLICY ADVOCATES OR PROCESS

ADMINISTRATORS 20-21 (1978) (noting the lack of studies connecting staff behavior with legislative
consequences). For example, Farber and Frickey argue that Justice Scalia's example of staff independence in creating legislative history was misperceived. Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 44042. Staff were attentive to the wishes of legislators, at least to Committee Chairman Dole.
28. M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 75-93 & 241; H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL
STAFFS 143 (1977).
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taxable scholarships. 29 Although the matter was of importance to students, it did not raise a major question of statutory structure and relying
on this legislative history posed no threat to a deliberative model.
Opponents of relying on legislative history might respond that writing law through legislative history is usually such a threat to a deliberative model of legislation that courts should disregard it, in the hope of
discouraging the kind of legislative carelessness which requires staff to
clarify the law. 30 We should be cautious, however, in advocating statutory interpretation rules to affect legislative behavior. There is no reason
to believe that disregarding legislative history will prompt a busy legislature to change its ways. Just as much legislative inattention to detail may
result, losing whatever guidance legislative history might provide.
Moreover, it is not clear that greater attention by legislators to the
statutory text is always desirable. The proliferation of statutory detail
can occupy a great deal of a legislator's time, and the result is often an
unintelligible statutory text. On balance, staff attention to detail may
sometimes be a useful technique for attending to the detail which legislators overlook.
2.

Private Interest Groups

Another reason for a gap between the creators of legislative history
and the requirements of normative models of the legislative process is
that those creating legislative history may be especially vulnerable to
powerful private interest group pressure. Strong private interest groups
might undermine all three models of political decisionmaking by giving
an undue advantage to one group, discouraging political deliberation,
and suppressing consideration of public values. This might occur in two
ways. First, those in a position to create legislative history, such as committee members, may be more representative of powerful private interest
groups than the legislature as a whole. This occurs whenever committee
membership is skewed towards those who can help interest groups in a
legislator's constituency. 3 ' Second, even if committees mirrored the leg29. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d sess. 11-17, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4105.
30. See Report to the Attorney General, supra note 3, at 63-64; Wallace v. Christensen, 802
F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
31. Such skewing of committee membership is said to occur with some frequency. See Weingast & Marshall, The IndividualOrganizationof Congress, or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms,Are Not

Organizedas Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 148-55 (1988); Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 53-56 (1988); Bullock, US.
Senate Committee Assignments: Preferences, Motivation and Success, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 789, 79495, 801 (1985); Eulau, Committee Selection in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note

23, at 191, 208-15 (the reelection hypothesis for explaining committee assignments has been replaced
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islature, the secretive and staff-dominated process of creating legislative
history might be more amenable to private interest group pressure than
the process of writing legislation.3 2 Judicial rejection of legislative history might therefore reduce the ability of private interest groups to shape
the law.
The danger of private interest group manipulation of legislative history, however, can be exaggerated. The distinction between private interest and public values is notoriously difficult to make. Many political
claims can plausibly be described as advancing either private interests or
public values. Moreover, even assuming that "private interests" can be
identified, their impact on legislative history is hard to assess. Political
results can be misidentified as the product of private interest group pressure.3 3 And committees are not uniformly subject to influence by private
interest groups. Some committees are more "national issue" than "clientele-oriented,"' 34 and the public interest is sometimes well-represented in
the committee's deliberations by influential legislative and executive
branch officials.3 5 Finally, private interests groups cannot be unambiguously associated with defects in the legislative process. Private interests
may carry a public value banner, such as farmers arguing for food
stamps. Interest groups that care about legislation may be a source of
by a "constituency concern" hypothesis). Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control and
the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 39, 49 n.22 (1986), links these empirical
observations to a critique of judicial reliance on committee reports. But see G. GOODWIN, THE
LITTLE LEGISLATURES 78 (1970) (urban representative on agriculture committee).
32. See H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, supra note 28, at 98, 116 (commenting on the role of staff in
communicating with lobbyists); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disapproving of private interest lobbying through
staff); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (same). See also Hatch, supra note 20, at 44-45 (speculating that a Senator's speech might be
an unreviewed opinion of unelected staff, with the collaboration of union intellectuals).
33. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process" The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 688-98 (1987); Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 269-73 (1988); Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 123, 150-60 (1989).
34. G. GOODWIN, supra note 31, at 102-03. National issue orientation (which usually characterizes the Joint Committee on Taxation) is not, however, a guarantee that private interest lobbying
will be ineffective. See Manley, supra note 24, at 1066 (complaints about former Chief of Staff of
Joint Committee on Taxation).
35. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 stated that the deduction of costs for property,
including "books," must be deferred. I.R.C. § 263A(b) (1986) (flush language), as added by Tax
Reform Act of 1986, § 803(a), 100 Stat. 2350. The Committee Report added that the property
covered by the statute included not only books, but also "similar property embodying words, ideas,
concepts, images, or sounds, by the creator thereof." H.R. REP. No. 99-841 (II), 99th Cong., 2d
sess. 308 (1986). This legislative history seemed to require authors as well as publishers to defer
costs, a result which favored the government and advanced the public interest in tax equity. (Congress has since decided that authors should be more favorably treated than the legislative history
provided. I.R.C. § 263A(h) (1986), as added by Pub. L. 100-647, § 6026(a), - Stat. - .)
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information about statutory defects which are clarified by the legislative
history.
3.

Participation by Other Legislators

Even if staff creation of legislative history and the influence of private interest groups were not problems, there is something inappropriate
about selected legislators making law without the participation of other
legislators. Never mind that the creators of legislative history may in
fact be agents of the legislature. Courts do not have to accept their status
as agents for purposes of determining statutory meaning, whatever may
be the internal legislative arrangement.
We do not in fact know a great deal about the opportunity for legislators not on the committee writing legislative history to participate in its
creation. The critical empirical question is whether a legislator's personal
staff monitors legislation, because only staff have enough time for this
task. There is a significant literature on the role of congressional staff,
but it focusses more on committee than personal staff.36 In studies which
pay significant attention to personal staff, few deal at any length with
legislative work. One study dealing with the legislative role of personal
staff notes that staff keep track of legislation outside of their employer's
committee assignments. 37 But some anecdotal evidence indicates that
relatively few legislators concern themselves with legislative history, 3
and that those in control of the committee process are not always forthcoming about their work.39 No research of which I am aware directly
addresses the precise question of personal staff concern with legislative
history.
36. See K. KOFMEHL, supra note 20; M. MALBIN, supra note 21; H. Fox & S. HAMMOND,
supra note 28. The two best known articles about congressional staff deal with committee, not personal staffs. See Patterson, The ProfessionalStaffs of CongressionalCommittees, 15 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
22 (1970); Price, Professionals and "Entrepreneurs"-Staff Orientationsand Policy Making on Three
Senate Committees, 33 J. POL. 316 (1971). See generally Hammond, Legislative Staffs in HANDBOOK
OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 273 (G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson, & M. Jewell, eds. 1985).
There is much literature on legislative committees, some of which discusses committee staff.
See Eulau & McCluggage, Standing Committees in Legislatures in HANDBOOK 'OF LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH, supra, at 395. See, e.g., R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITrEES 82 (1973); G.
GOODWIN, THE LITTLE LEGISLATURES 142-52 (1970); W. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-

TEES 52-55 (1969).
37. H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, supra note 28, at 89, 91, 94, 196 (indicating that personal staff's
job is to keep track of legislation not before their employer's committees). See also Hammond, supra
note 23, at 277 (personal staff influential on matters before committees on which Senator did not
serve); FALLOWS, TECHNICAL STAFFING FOR CONGRESS: THE MYTH OF EXPERTISE 75 (1980)
(personal staff monitors proposals in terms of home-district interests); D. KOZAK, CONTEXTS OF
CONGRESSIONAL DECISION BEHAVIOR 112 (1984) (personal staff research includes consultation
with committee members and staffs).
38. C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: HIs WORK As HE SEES IT 136 (1963).
39. H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, supra note 28, at 106.
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If we focus on committee members, rather than on legislators interested in legislation outside of their committee assignments, there is also
doubt about whether they have access to the creation of legislative history. A 1963 study of congressional staff includes complaints by a committee member that he was not informed about the content of his
committee's report. 4° Moreover, one committee member observed that
his chairman sometimes placed statements in the Congressional Record
that did not reflect the Member's views of the committee's action. 4 1 Insofar as this problem arises from the committee chair's control over committee staff who draft legislative history, the enlargement of staff for
minority and other committee members 42 may have reduced the chair's
power.

43

We can, however, confidently assert that legislators who are not on
committees in charge of legislation generally do not participate in creating legislative history and that there are obstacles to their opportunity to
participate. This reality, however, does not dispose of the question of
judicial reliance on specific legislative history. If we were sure that legislative history was always politically manipulative and that staff-created
statements should be disregarded, low participation potential might be
sufficient to dismiss judicial reliance across-the-board. But the relative
advantages of relying on specific legislative history to elaborate on statutory structure in selected situations justifies avoiding such a broad rule.
C. Standardsfor Relying on Specific Legislative History
The point of this discussion is not that the role of unelected staff and
private interests is never cause for concern about relying on specific legislative history. Rather, overreaction by rejecting all such legislative history is unwise. The proper judicial response is to be selective about when
to accept or reject specific legislative history.
40. K. KOFMEHL, supra note 20, at 122 (even committee members may not know what is in the
committee report). Important legislation, as well as legislative history, may also escape the notice of
interested legislators. For example, relevant Members of Congress were not notified that a provision
denying the FCC a waiver power was in a continuing resolution. News America Publishing, Inc. v.
FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
41. C. CLAPP, supra note 38, at 136.
42.
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(4th ed. 1986); M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 13.
43. It is also hard to know how to evaluate particular complaints about inadequate opportunities to participate. Complaints may come from a loser in the political battle, from someone who
thinks legislative history is overemphasized vis-d-vis the statutory language, Farber & Frickey, supra
note 22, at 439-42 & nn.60-61, or from someone with a nostalgic longing for a Republican age in
which committees were subservient to a deliberating Congress. G. GOODWIN, supra note 31, at 6-9
(Republicans near the time of the Founding believed major legislative work should be done by Congress and that committees should take instructions from the Committee of the Whole).
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A court should ask two questions. First, is the legislative history an
attempt to settle a contentious political debate which accompanied the
statute's passage-a "politically sensitive" issue? Legislators should take
responsibility for resolving such contentious issues in the statutory text,
rather than running the risk that private interest groups will manipulate
the result through legislative history. In some cases, such legislative history will be clearly countermajoritarian, in the sense that the gap between legislative history and what the legislature as a whole might want
is too great. 44 But even without evidence that the legislative history is
countermajoritarian, issues which were the subject of contentious but unresolved political debate should not be resolved through legislative
history.
Second, does the legislative history undermine the statutory structure? This criterion focusses on a different problem from countermajoritarian legislative history. A provision is countermajoritarian when it
contradicts the results of an explicit political battle. Many issues of statutory interpretation are not explicitly disputed during a statute's passage,
but may nonetheless implicate the statute's overall structure. Although
legislative deliberation about statutory structure may be too much to expect in all cases, the damage to the deliberative process is excessive when
staff and private interest groups undermine that structure through legis45
lative history.
When the issue is not politically sensitive or the statutory structure
is not undermined, courts do well to rely on specific statements in the
legislative history which elaborate on statutory detail.4 6 The attraction
of relying on such legislative history is especially strong in very technical
44. This is illustrated by an example from environmental legislation. Ackerman & Hassler,
Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1559-61 (1980) give the
following account of the history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The issue was how to
interpret a statutory rule about emission standards in the Clean Air Act. Some House Members of
Congress wanted to favor Eastern producers of dirty coal by adopting a standard that would not give
clean coal producers an edge. These Members advocated a rule requiring clean (as well as dirty) coal
users to reduce emissions by adopting costly pollution control technology. They placed a statement
in the legislative history to achieve that result, despite the language of the statute which suggested
the absence of such a requirement and in the face of a prior legislative vote suggesting the absence of
political sympathy for Eastern dirty coal producers.
Other likely examples of countermajoritarian legislative history are cited in Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Equal Access to Justice Act); Jordan v.
Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Freedom of Information Act). Cf.
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J. concurring)
(legislative history meant by its progenitors to serve political not legal function).
45. The assumption that there is a statutory structure would probably be greeted with skepticism by many advocates of the Law and Economics approach. See generally Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
46. I am assuming that there is no conflict with a clear statutory text, in which case the text
should prevail in any event, absent absurd consequences. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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areas of the law. When the choice is between courts becoming embroiled
with technically complex interpretive issues or deferring to legislative
history drafted by those competent to work out statutory detail, the deci47
sion to rely on the legislative history makes good sense.
Some will observe an irony in the argument that judicial reliance on
legislative history permits courts to defer to other decisionmakers. One
objection to letting courts use legislative history is the risk of aggrandizing judicial power, by giving courts another string to their interpretive
bow and permitting them to hide policy choices behind deference to legislative intent. 48 There is no denying that the standards for deciding
whether to rely on legislative history require an exercise of judicial discretion. But objections to judicial discretion are more cogently directed
to scavenging through legislative history for shreds of evidence about
what the statute means and patching those shreds together to construct
meaningful legislative history. By contrast, clear statements in the legislative history about matters of statutory detail do not allow the court an
excessive opportunity for creative reconstruction of legislative intent.
Therefore, such statements can be reliable evidence of statutory meaning,
without increasing the court's opportunity to manipulate or conceal its
49
reasoning.
47. Tax committee staffs, for example, are often cited for their technical competence. M. MALBIN, supra note 21, at 166-87; Manley, supra note 24, at 1066; Price, supra note 23, at 326-31.
Moreover, a sophisticated bar may expect legislative history to be very important in highly technical
areas of law, such as tax. See Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, Reexamining the Nature and Role of
Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804 (1989).
Not everyone would agree that tax issues are more appropriately left for resolution by legislative
history. Senator Armstrong, for example, objected strongly to relying on committee reports, especially in tax legislation. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 440, 41 n.61.
After preparing this article, I had the opportunity to read Livingston, Congress, the Courts,and
the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991), dealing
with legislative history and tax statutes. I agree with the general point of the article, which is that
the "best way to view I legislative history may be in institutional terms, as part of the evolving
relationship between Congress, the courts, and administrative agencies in the making of tax law and
policy." Id. at 873. I do not, however, share the author's negative attitude towards specific legislative history, what he calls "writ[ing] regulations in the committee report." Id. at 880. Exactly how
much disagreement we have is unclear because, despite his view that such detail lies within the
institutional competence of Congress, id. at 882, he ends up giving significant weight to detailed
committee reports. Id. at 879 ("deference [to Committee Reports] somewhat less than that provided
a Treasury Regulation").
48. See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing legislative history is like "looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends"); Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d, at 1343.
49. Another criterion for using specific legislative history is suggested by the requirement that
legislators have the potential to participate in its creation. At a minimum, legislators should recognize the document as one which embodies political agreement. This rules out judicial use of affidavits
prepared by legislators in connection with litigation because they are not recognized vehicles for
producing political agreement.
Despite this shortcoming, courts vary in their willingness to consider affidavits. Compare City
of Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 89 P.2d 826 (1939) (affidavits were accorded no probative
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D. Application of Standards
These standards for judicial deference to specific legislative history
are meant to acknowledge the risks of judicial reliance without disregarding its advantages. In this last section I will test these standards by applying them to some familiar types of legislative history---committee
reports and the Congressional Record. These standards provide a somewhat different evaluation of their utility than under the more conventional analysis.
1. Committee Reports
Most legislation today is worked out in committee. Legislators know
that this is where political agreements are made. Legislators generally
have the resources, if not always the will, to keep track of the process.
Committee reports are therefore properly treated as the most reliable
50
type of legislative history.
Some committee reports may not stand up well, however, when
measured against the standards outlined above. The conference committee report is traditionally considered the most reliable form of legislative
history,5 1 presumably because the opinion of both Houses of Congress
comes closest to being an expression of legislative intent. But the circumstances under which the conference committee report is issued cast doubt
on its reliability. Many conferences resolve politically sensitive disputes
at the end of the legislative session, in an environment of frantic activity
aimed at winding up the legislative session. This setting is also not conducive to providing other legislators with an adequate opportunity to
participate in creating legislative history. 52 It is nonetheless difficult to
generalize, even about conference committee reports. Not all issues reweight); Bread Political Action Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982)
(same) with Stewart v. Board of Medical Assurance, 143 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Ct. App. 1978) (evidence
admissible). Cf Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) (in
extraordinary cases testimony of legislators should be accepted to determine whether the legislature
had an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose); Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d, at 1343-44 (press
releases and opinion polls should not be reliable legislative history). See also Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 309-10 n.2 (1945) (it is constitutional to deny a litigant the opportunity to
prove legislative intent by testimony).
50. Even Judge Mikva, whose legislative experience makes him wary of relying on legislative
history, treats committee reports as evidence of statutory meaning. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's
Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385. See also Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITr.
L. REV. 627 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985); Monterey Coal Co. v. Fed.
Mine Safety & Health Review Bd., 743 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1984); Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d
507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
52. See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 44, at 1505-11. See generally L. LONGLEY & W.
OLESZEK, BICAMERAL POLITICS, CONFERENCE COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (1989).
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solved in conference-even at the end of a session-are politically contentious. And the risk of subsequent exposure in the public press may
discourage some efforts to manipulate the law.5 3
There may also be institutional advantages to using committee reports to make law rather than relying on the statutory text. An opportunity to amend statutory language will often open up the legislative
process to the addition of unrelated riders to a popular bill, even though
the amendments could not pass on their own, or to the addition of killer
amendments to attract opposition that would not otherwise materialize.
This possibility is especially serious at the end of the legislative session,
when slowing down the bill to fight over controversial provisions may
threaten to kill the legislation. Once a committee agrees on statutory
language, the committee report may become the preferred vehicle for
resolving issues that surface later, without calling back the entire committee to deliberate on the statutory language. And once the House and
Senate conferees agree on a version of a bill, the conference committee
report may prove similarly convenient. 54 The rushed process of writing
legislative history at the end of a legislative session may even protect the
process from private interest lobbying, contrary to the usual assumption,
by shortening the time to mobilize private interest group pressure.
2.

The Congressional Record and Manufactured Legislative History

The standards discussed earlier for judicial reliance on specific legislative history accord more weight to legislative history found in the Congressional Record than critics of this practice might allow. The charge of
planting material in the Congressional Record is usually considered the
"most strongly held" objection to legislative history, 55 on the ground that
the Congressional Record often records manufactured conversations
staged for a virtually nonexistent audience. 56 But this reality does not
justify automatic rejection of such legislative history.
53. For example, the funding for a school for North African Jews was repealed when Senator
Inouye's sponsorship became a public embarrassment to his ambitions for future political leadership.
1988 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 242. See also Senator Byrd, Launches Crusade Against Influence
Peddling,47 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2009 (1989) (Senator Byrd was so offended by lobbying for a
project that he not only opposed it, even though it benefitted his constituency, but also sponsored
legislation to discourage such lobbying practices).
54. 33 TAX NOTES 125 (1986) reports the difficulty in obtaining unanimous consent for making
amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 at the end of the legislative session.
55. Report to the Attorney General, supra note 3, at 53-54.
56. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J., at 384 (referring to the pas
de deux in manufacturing legislative history). Congress has responded to these complaints in two
ways. Since 1978, if no part of the material was spoken on the floor of Congress, it appears with a
black mark (a bullet) in the Congressional Record. 124 CONG. REC. 3676 (1978). And in 1986 the
House adopted a one year experiment, H.R. 230, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), requiring the printing
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Manufactured legislative histories are often carefully worked out
with other legislators, 57 just like material found in committee reports. If
the legislature were a debating society for most legislation, or if the court
required legislative history to be part of such a deliberative process to be
useful evidence of statutory meaning, manufactured legislative history
would be suspect. But if the producers of legislative history are legitimate independent sources of statutory meaning, the fact that legislative
history is "manufactured" is not a drawback. 58
Manufactured legislative history is sometimes unfavorably contrasted with "hot debate," 5 9 but skepticism should run in the other direction. Hot debate is frequently about politically sensitive issues which
should not be resolved through legislative history. Moreover, it often
provides inconclusive evidence of conflicting legislative purposes, rather
than clarification of matters of statutory detail. 6° Hot debate may therefore be significantly less useful in determining statutory meaning than
6
manufactured legislative history. '
III.

CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that judicial interpretation will cease to be the primary
focus of attention for those interested in statutory interpretation. But
in different type-face of remarks not spoken on the floor of Congress. This experiment was made
permanent the next year. H.R. 514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
57. See 33 TAX NOTES 128 (1986), discussing the recognized use of colloquies on the floor of
the House and Senate to record political agreements. But see Hatch, supra note 20, at 44-45 (material in the Congressional Record not worked out in advance).
58. An additional requirement for relying on manufactured colloquies in the Congressional
Record is that they represent the last word on a bill as it progresses through the legislative process.
Frequently, colloquies occur too long before final passage to reflect final agreement, or they conflict
with reports of committee deliberations. When the manufactured colloquies occur towards the end
of the discussion of legislation, however, they may be as useful as committee reports, especially if
there is no committee consideration of a bill. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
526-27 (1982).
59. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Pm. L. REV., at 631.
60. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-28 (1979); id. at 23051 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The legislative history dealt with questions of equal opportunity and
access to jobs. Cf Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 952 (1979) (emotional debate about funding abortion is evidence of congressional hostility to
federal funding).
61. Legislative history recorded after passage of the legislation being interpreted may also meet
the standards discussed in the text. The conventional criticism of later legislative history is that it
cannot be part of the statutory context, because it postdates passage. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the
Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressionaland ConstitutionalSilence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 529-31
(1982). See Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Service, 462 U.S. 810, 832 n.28
(1983) (House Managers Statement not available to Congress before passage of the law). But requiring legislative history to be context assumes that it is useful as evidence of legislative intent. The
argument in the text rejects legislative intent in favor of standards which focus on the institutional
competence of authors of legislative history. From this perspective, later legislative history that is a
product of committee review of prior law may be entitled to deference.
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nonjudicial interpreters may have a different perspective on the meaning
of legal texts, which is interesting in its own right and which courts
might do well to adopt. This symposium has focussed attention on a
variety of nonjudicial interpreters, such as agencies, the makers of legislative history, legislatures, and lawyers. Perhaps there are others-treatise
writers, for example-to whom we ought to listen. The symposium contributors have advanced reasons why nonjudicial interpretations deserve
deference and, in some cases, the commentators have criticized their conclusions. At the very least, the symposium should force us to be more
sophisticated about the relative competence of different interpreters and
the claims made to support their view of what a legal text means.

